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A non trivial amount of empirical evidence has shown that in Argentina there have been a 
lack of convergence between less and more developed regions (Figueras, et al., 2003, 
2004; Russo and Ceña Delgado, 2000; Marina, 1998; Utrera and Koroch, 1998; 
Willington, 1998; Porto, 1994, 1996). This outcome is present even despite of the 
existence of a voluminous system of redistributive fiscal transfers. 
 
The evidence we present below try to provide a plausible and much stylised explanation to 
an observed phenomenon where provinces that receive the highest per capita transfers 
show the worst behaviour in terms of footloose activities, i.e. manufactures. This result 
could be, to some extent, due to a Dutch disease like phenomenon that is negatively 
affecting the growth opportunities of provinces that are most benefited by fiscal transfers. 
Our hypothesis is that fiscal transfers, through an increasing purchasing power, may be 
producing a negative effect on the incentive of manufacturing producers to locate on those 
provinces which receive the largest transfers. Additionally, a non-benevolent behaviour by 
State governments may be also contributing to this negative effect. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follow. In section 1 we discuss briefly the literature on 
the effects of capital flows, foreign aid and the Dutch disease. Section 2 presents a stylised 
description of the recent evolution of Argentina’s system of transfers from the Federal to 
State governments, looking at the correlation between these transfers and State 
governments current expenditures; some econometric evidence is also presented. In section 
3 we develop a theoretical model inspired on the New Economic Geography to try to 
explain the stylised facts presented in the previous section. Section 4 concludes. 
 
I. Capital flows, foreign aid, and the Dutch disease 
 
The neoclassical theory, under its usual set of assumptions, predicts that in response to a 
difference in the rates of return there should be a net flow of capital from richer to poorer 
countries, such that the later would growth faster producing a convergence in per capita 
income between these two groups of countries. However there is plenty of evidence where 
observed outcomes are not in line with the theoretical predictions. Almost twenty years ago  
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an influential neoclassical author like Robert Lucas
1 pointed out that the direction of 
capital flows were quite different from those suggested by the theory. A paradox that 
appears to have become stronger as time (and globalisation) moves forward. Even more 
striking is the fact that capital appears to flow in the direction from poor countries to rich 
ones. 
 
These findings have led some authors to suggest for the need of government intervention. 
The question that then arises is what could be the effects of capital inflows on less 
developed regions? The answers are not homogeneous and often contradictory. On the one 
hand, we have works such as Clemens et al. (2004) pointing out that capital flows are 
beneficial for poorer regions; on the other hand works such that of Rajan and Subramanian 
(2008) point out to a potentially negative effect derived from capital inflows. All these 
contributions deal with the issue of international capital mobility. To the best of our 
knowledge there has been no attempt to study the phenomenon at thesub-national level
2. 
Because of this, most of the literature we rely on refers to the problem in an international 
perspective. 
 
To some extent, but with the required qualifications, the debate resembles the controversy 
between J. M. Keynes and Bertil Ohlin regarding the transfers required to fulfil the 
payments imposed on Germany after its defeat in the First World War. This controversy 
centred around the effects that such transfers would produce both on the recipient countries 
but mostly on Germany, the “donor”. However, the debate then was kept under a static 
framework. Currently, the debate incorporates a dynamic dimension to this problem by 
looking at the effects that such transfers could have on the structure of production of 
countries that benefit from a positive net capital flow, and how this could affect the 
achievement of what we may call as the new “El Dorado” or, in more technical terms, 
sustainable growth.  
 
There exists evidence that supports the idea that, under some circumstances, the aid 
received by less developed regions may end up becoming an iron life vest. In the early 
fifties, Samuelson (1952) analysed the problem under a macro framework assuming a two-
                                                 
1 Lucas (1990). 
2 There are some references in the literature that recognize this point without going into a detailed study of 
this phenomenon. See for example Torvik (2002).   
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country Walrasian model, concluding that the transfer paradox was not logically viable. 
Later, other studies relaxed some of Samuelson’s assumptions and suggested that the 
transfer paradox was indeed a possible outcome under a Walrasian model if: a) there were 
more than two countries (Gale, 1974, Chichilnisky, 1980); b)  a general equilibrium trade 
model is used (Bhagwati et al., 1993; Yano, 1983); and c) free trade was absent (Brecher 
and Bhagwati, 1982). Hirschman (1958) also suggested the transfer paradox could work 
through changes in relative prices, with foreign aid increasing the relative price of non-
tradable goods because of the expansion of domestic demand. 
 
The empirical evidence is scarce and limited to the case of international transfers. Yano 
and Nugent (1999) address the problem using a small economy model which receives 
exogenous foreign aid and is unable to affect its terms of trade. The model also assumes 
capital and labour are domestically mobile across sectors but not internationally. There are 
three goods, one non-tradable and two goods that are internationally traded. The authors 
distinguish between two potential effects: a) an import substitution effect; and b) a 
domestic good effect. While the authors find that the import substitution effect is absent in 
most of the 44 countries included into their sample, the domestic good effect shows a 
negative contribution to growth, offsetting, at least partially, the direct positive effects 
from foreign aid. 
 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) provide more conclusive evidence in their examination of 
the effects of international capital flows on the process of development. More specifically, 
they look at if less developed countries that experienced a faster growth were also the most 
dependants on foreign savings. The outcome the authors arrive to suggests countries that 
have resorted to less foreign financing have grown faster. They conclude that the 
dependency on foreign capital may produce a perverse outcome through the appreciation 
of the local currency, that if large enough may produce a Dutch disease like phenomenon, 
affecting negatively the competitiveness of sectors that are crucial if a sustainable growth 
is to be achieved, such as is the case of manufacturing production. Similarly, in a recent 
survey paper, Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) conclude that foreign aid has been largely 
ineffective in fostering economic growth and that one plausible explanation for this result 
is the Dutch disease effect on the exchange rates of the countries on the recipient end.   
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Up to now, we have limited our discussion to the Dutch disease problem in its standard 
context, that of international transfers. Within our framework, the Dutch disease is the 
phenomenon with negative consequences that may follow after an (important) increase in 
foreign capital inflows. The increase in foreign capital flows produces an increase in the 
demand of both tradable and non-tradable goods. The higher demand for tradable goods 
could be met by an increase in imports and a reduction of exports, which would also help 
to counteract the appreciation of the local currency that follows after the initial flow of 
foreign capital. However, if the possibility of satisfying the increasing demand for the non-
tradable goods is restricted by rigidities on the supply side, this would provoke a further 
appreciation of the local currency, and therefore hurting in the short-run the international 
competitiveness of domestic producers; even the long-run competitiveness may also be 
affected if the economy is less attractive to local and foreign investors. 
 
If the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the increase in foreign capital inflows would lead to 
an increase in the supply of the domestic currency, resulting in an increase in domestic 
prices, which is equivalent to an appreciation of the local currency through a reduction in 
the nominal exchange rate. 
 
In the case of a country, it is possible to counterbalance the negative effects of an increase 
in foreign capital inflows through restrictive fiscal and/or monetary policies. This 
alternative is of course absent in the case of regions which belong to a single economy, 
since they share the same currency. Thus, the recommendation to compensate for the 
negative effects of an increase in transfers is to achieve a higher productivity and to 
increase the capacity to produce non-tradable goods, which would help to reduce the 
pressure on the relative price of these goods. 
 
II. Fiscal transfers, public sector expenditure and manufacturing production. Some 
stylised facts for Argentina’s provinces 
 
In this section we present a brief and much stylised description of the correlations between 
vertical fiscal transfers from the Federal government to Argentine State governments, 
public sector expenditure on labour, and production of manufactures. We also provide 
some econometric evidence. We use data for 1990 to 2001.  
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The main share of transfers State governments receive from the Federal government is that 
corresponding to the Co-participation Regime.
3 If we separate Argentina’s provinces into 
four mutually exclusive groups according to their income per-capita and population 
density, the results show that in general provinces with low population density (LD), either 
with high (HI) or low (LI) income per capita, receive the highest transfers in per capita 
terms
4 (see Table 1). Despite the fact that the legal provisions regulating the distribution of 
transfers across provinces are not very clear about the criteria for redistribution
5, it can be 
seen clearly that provinces with LD are the ones most benefited. To some extent, this 
behaviour could be explained by the existence of important diseconomies of scale in the 
provision of public goods in provinces with low population density. 
 
Including Current Transfers, those outside the Co-participation Regime and over which the 
Federal government can adopt a more arbitrary behaviour, the results are barely changed. 
However, against what it could a priori be expected, provinces that belong to the LI-HD 
group are less benefited than provinces falling into the group with HI-LD indices. For 
instance, while for the latter, Current Transfers represented a 28% of transfers received 
under the Co-participation Regime, for the group of provinces with LI-HD indices the 
percentage was just 8%. For LI-LD provinces, there are not many changes when we 
consider different definitions of transfers. The same behaviour as the one just described is 
observed if we look at total transfers. 
                                                 
3 The Co-participation regime is the system by which Argentina’s provinces transferred to the Federal 
government the legal power to collect some taxes. The collection from these taxes is then, partially, 
redistributed to the provinces.  
4 Following Capello and Roca (1999) we use the median values of per capita GDP and population density to 
distinguish between provinces with low and high values. 
5 For instance, in the Law 23548 that regulates the Co-participation regime there is no explicit reference to 
how the share each province receive is calculated. Porto and Sanguinetti (1998) argue that the distribution is 
positively correlated with the number of per capita representatives each province has in the Federal Congress.  
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Table 1 
Transfers from Federal Government: 1990-2001 average 
Group 
(*) 
Province  Co-participation per capita Co-participation + Current 
transfers per capita 
Tax + Current transfers per 
capita 
  1993 $ Ranking  1993 $ Ranking  1933 $ Ranking 
HI – HD 
Santa Fe  269.7 20  283.9 20  399.9 20 
Córdoba 269.1 21  279.8 21  385.1 21 
Buenos Aires  145.7 23  152.9 23  249.2 23 
Capital Federal  46.2 24  53.6 24  70.4 24 
HI – LD 
Tierra del Fuego  816.8 1  1,295.6 2  2232.2 1 
Santa Cruz  783.4 3  1,014.5 3  1612.1 3 
La Rioja  719.8 5  1,394.5 1  1767.6 2 
San Luís  618.1 6  641.3 7  964.0 7 
La Pampa  590.4 7  662.5 6  989.8 6 
Río Negro  417.6 12  458.7 12  686.4 14 
Chubut 361.2 15  430.1 13  723.3 11 
Neuquén 355.5 16  425.7 14  690.9 12 
LI – LD 
Catamarca 814.1 2  847.1 4  1201.3 4 
Formosa 726.4 4  779.5 5  1079.0 5 
San Juan  517.7 8  564.4 8  793.9 8 
Santiago del Estero  492.9 9  521.0 9  725.9 10 
Salta 348.4 17  385.5 17  555.2 18 
LI – HD 
Chaco 481.3 10  506.7 11  687.0 13 
Jujuy 445.4 11  509.4 10  734.3 9 
Entre Ríos  393.5 13  414.4 15  592.7 16 
Corrientes 378.8 14  412.0 16  603.5 15 
Tucumán 337.5 18  362.5 19  517.2 19 
Misiones 332.5 19  382.0 18  559.4 17 
Mendoza 244.5 22  254.5 22  374.9 22 
HI: high income; LI: low income; HD: high population density; LD: low population density.  
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In Figures 1 to 3 we present the correlation relationship that there exist between different pairs of 
variables. Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients as well as their statistical significance. As it is 
very clear form the Figures, it is possible to observe a positive and significant correlation between 
the amounts of per capita transfers received from the Federal government and the expenditure in 
personnel and public employment by the State governments. These relationships give us support for 
our presumption that in the case of Argentina, State-level governments follow a non-benevolent 
behaviour when using public resources
6 
 
Another empirical evidence of how State governments react to Federal transfers is shown in Figure 
4. State governments that receive higher transfers from the Federal government impose a lower 
effective tax pressure on their economies, even when the legal tax pressure does not vary greatly 
across regions. 
 
Finally, it is possible to observe that there exists a negative correlation between the per capita 




Federal transfers and State governments expenditures 











Co-participation (*) 0.662 0.267 0.758 -0.274
Other tax transfers (*) 0.912 0.713 0.667 -0.120
Current transfers (*) 0.680 0.473 0.559 -0.252
Co-participation + 
Current Transfers (*)
0.788 0.424 0.785 -0.311
Tax and Current 
Transfers (*)
0.876 0.557 0.779 -0.252
 
(*) Per capita, (**) Per 1000 inhabitants, (***) % GDP. 
All correlations are statistically significant at 5%. 
 
                                                 
6 If instead of using expenditure in personnel and public employment, we use the average monthly wage paid by local 
governments, the relationship with per capita transfers is still positive but less significant. 
7 It is important to note that we are not implying the existence of a causal relationship between the two variables at this 
stage of our work.   
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Figure 1 
Co-participation Transfers and State Governments Expenditures 
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Figure 2 
Co-participation + Current Transfers and State Governments Expenditures 
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Figure 3 
Tax + Current Transfers and State Governments Expenditures 
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Figure 4 
Federal Government transfers and State Governments Tax Pressure 
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Federal transfers and State average manufacturing production growth (±) 
Correlation Matrix: 1990-2001, constant 1993 prices 
  Total 
Manufactures GDP 
Per capita 
Manufactures GDP  
Co-participation (*)  -0.122  -0.247 
Other tax transfers (*)  -0.361 (#)  -0.469 (#) 
Current transfers (*)  -0.238  -0.324 
Co-participation + Current Transfers 
(*)  -0.194 -0.317 
Tax and Current Transfers (*)  -0.264  -0.387 (#) 
(±) State average growth rates are obtained from the linear regression: ln(Y) = a+b*t 
(*) Per capita. (#) Statistically significant at 10%.  
 
Departing from this very stylized evidence just presented, we now move onto presenting a 
formal theoretical model to try to disentangle the potential and some times offsetting effects that 
changes in the distribution of transfers from the Federal to the State governments may have on 
the distribution of footloose activities across regions within a country. 
 
III. The model 
 
We extend Rogers and Martin (1995) Footloose Capital Model (FCM) to analyse how changes in 
the distribution of transfers from the Federal to State governments affect the regional location of 
manufacturing production. We extend the FCM by including in each region a sector that 
produces a non-traded good and a local government which uses public resources to hire public 
employment. 
 
Firstly we will present the full model, and then when we look at the effects of transfers on the 
location of manufacturing production, we will work with two alternative cases, depending on the 
number of sectors we consider. The full model includes four sectors, agriculture, manufactures, 
and a non-traded sector in each of the two regions the country is divided. Both, the agricultural 
good and the non-traded goods are produced under constant returns to scale (CRS) using only 
labour (L). The production of manufactures presents increasing returns to scale (IRS), and  
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involves the use of capital (K) as a fixed cost, and labour (L) as a variable cost. The market for 
manufactures is organised as a monopolistically competitive market à la Dixit-Stiglitz, where 
each firm in the market produces a differentiated variety. Trade of manufactures between the two 
regions is subject to positive transport costs, which take the well-known Samuelson’s iceberg 
type. The markets for the agricultural good as well as those of the non-traded goods are perfectly 
competitive. Trade of the agricultural good between the two regions is costless. By definition, 
each non-traded good is sold only in the region it is produced. We assume also that labour is 
perfectly mobile between sectors but immobile between regions, capital, instead, is mobile 
between regions. There are also two levels of governments, a national government and two local 
governments. The national government, which we do not model explicitly taxes all capital 
revenues
8 and transfers them to the two regions. These transfers can go either to the local 
governments or be received directly by consumers. Local governments use all transfers they 
receive to hire employees




Consumers in each region have a two-tier utility function. The first tier takes a Cobb-Douglas 
form, and is defined over the consumption of the agricultural good, the non-traded good and a 
composite of manufactures. More specifically, the utility function for the representative 
consumer living in region i can be stated as follows:  
() () ()           with  1
NT AM
i i A NT M A NT M uc c c
β ββ
ββ β =+ + =  
where cA is the consumption of the agricultural good, cNTi is the consumption of the non-traded 
good produced in region i, and cM is the consumption of the composite of manufactures. βA, βNT 
and βM are the expenditure shares the consumer spends on the consumption of each good. 
The cM composite takes the following CES form: 
()
1







=< < ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∑  
                                                 
8 This assumption is made based on the literature on public finance which suggests it is more efficient for a Federal 
government, instead of state level governments, to tax footloose activities that are potentially mobile across regions. 
9 Public employment can be also interpreted as a kind of non-traded good. 
10 This assumption, which we believe is a very good approximation of the way local governments behave in 
Argentina, follows from the evidence presented in section II.  
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where  c(h) is the units consumed of each variety h, and N=n1+n2 is the total number of 
manufacture varieties, n1 and n2 are the number of varieties produced in regions 1 and 2 
respectively. From the consumer maximisation problem we have that the consumption of each 























i pT  is the consumer price of a variety consumed in region i and produced in region j, 
PMi is the manufacture price index in region i, Ei is the total income of consumers living in 
region i, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between manufactured varieties
11. The assumption 
that trade of manufactures is subject to iceberg-type costs means the following relationship 
between consumer and producer prices: 
        if  





pTp T i j




where τ > 1 are iceberg transport costs, and pT
i and pT
j are the producer prices in regions i and j 
respectively. The notion of iceberg transport costs means that for one unit of the good consumed 
in region i, τ  units need to be shipped from j. 





















As stated above, production of the agricultural good and the two non-trade goods are subject to 
constant returns to scale, and uses only labour. More specifically, we assume the following 
production functions: 
                                                 









where LAi and LNTi are the units of labour used in the production of agriculture and the non-
traded sector in region i. From the producer problems for each of the two sectors, the prices of 
the agricultural and non-traded goods are: 
ii i pAp N Tw ==  
where wi is the wage rate in region i. The assumption that the agricultural good has no transport 
cost between regions means that, if there is a positive production of it in both regions, in 
equilibrium we have wi=wj=w. This is not necessarily the case when we consider an economy 
with no agricultural sector. 
 
In the case of the production of manufactures, this uses capital and labour. The total cost of each 
variety produced in region i is given by: 
  ii i i CT F a w x π =+  
where F is the requirement of capital, which does not depend on the scale of production xi, a is 
the requirement of labour for each unit of production, and πi is the rent of capital. 









Additionally, the assumption of free entry and exit of firms means that in equilibrium firms 
obtain zero profits ( ) 0
i
ii i i pT x aw x F π −− = , such that the scale of production of each 















=   and F=1, such that we get: 
i







=   
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Once again, the assumption that there is no trade cost for the agricultural good means that 
ij pTp T = . 
 
Capital rent and total expenditures 
 
Under Dixit-Stiglitz competition in the manufacturing sector, the rent of capital, also called 
operating profits, is given by the value of sales (at the producer price) divided by the elasticity of 
substitution: 
i
ii pT x π σ = .  
 
Total income is the sum of labour income plus the revenue from capital rent. As we assumed 
before, capital is mobile between regions, however capital owners remain always at the same 
location. In the absence of a national government that captures all capital income through taxes, 
we assume that independently where capital is used each unit is evenly owned between the 
populations of the two regions. Then, if L1=L2, residents in each region receive half of total 
operating profits, which are equal to: βME
W/σ, where  E
W is total expenditure, that under the 
assumption that there is no savings is equal to labour income plus operating profits: 
()
WW
ii jj M Ew L w L E β σ =++ . Solving for E
W we get: 










Now, let us assume that there exist a national government that taxes all capital income, and 
redistribute it between the two regions, with a proportion 01 i e ≤ ≤  going to region i, and a 
proportion  () 01 1 i e ≤− ≤  going to region j. Additionally, a proportion 01 φ ≤≤  of these 
transfers go directly to consumers, while the remaining percentage  () 01 1 φ ≤ −≤  goes to local 
governments, which use these transfers to finance public employment. Under these assumptions 
capital rent going to all consumers is equal to φβME
W/σ, such that world income is: 



































In each market the equilibrium condition is given by the equality between demand and supply, in 
particular we have: 
 









When the agriculture sector is included we assume that both regions have a positive production 
of good A, meaning that both LAi and LAj are positive. This assumption is guaranteed if total 
spending on the agricultural good, namely βAE
W, is greater than maximum value of the 
agriculture production by either region, namely pA(max{Li,Lj}). This assumption guaranties that 
wi=wj=w.  
 























-  Local government budgets 
As stated above, the national government, which we do not model here explicitly, taxes all 
capital revenue, and redistributes it between the two regions, in a proportion ei for region i and 
() 1 i e −  for region j. From these transfers only a proportion (1-φ) goes to the local governments,  
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which use these transfers to hire labour. Remembering that total operating profits are equal 
to
W
























where LGi and LGj are the numbers of public employees in regions i and j. 
 
-  Manufactures 

















−− =+  
where the first and second terms on the right hand side are, respectively, the total demand, 
including the quantity that melts in transit, by consumers of regions i and j  of each variety 

















−− =+  




ii j PM n pT n pT
σσ σ τ





ji j PM n pT n pT
σσ σ τ
−− − ⎡⎤ =+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 
Choosing units such that F=1, the number of varieties ni and nj are equal to the stock of capital 
in each region Ki and Kj. If the country stock of capital is normalised to 1 we have ni=ki and 






=  the price 
indices reduce to: 
() ( ) () ( )
1
1 1 1 1 ii i i j PM k w k w
σ σ σ τ
− − − =+ −   
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() ( ) () ( )
1
1 1 1 1 ji i i j PM k w k w
σ σ σ τ
− − − =+ −  
Furthermore, in the case there is an agriculture sector such that wages equalise across regions, 
and using the wage rate as numeraire (w=1) we obtain: 
() ()
1
1 1 1 ii i PM k k
σ σ τ
− − =+ −  
() ()
1
1 1 1 ji i PM k k
σ σ τ
− − =+ − 
 
-  Regional labour markets 
ii i ii
j jj jj
LL AL ML N TL G




where labour demands by the manufacturing sectors are  ii i LM nax = and  j jj LM n ax = . 
 
Transfers and the long run equilibrium 
 
In this section we analyse the distribution of manufacture production as a response to changes in 
the distribution of transfers from the national government. We divide the analysis in two cases. 
Firstly, we consider an economy where all sectors are present. Secondly, we consider a model 
with no agricultural sector. 
 
Case 1: a model with agriculture, manufactures, non-traded goods and local governments 
   
The existence of the agricultural sector, together with the assumption of positive productions in 
both regions, namely that total spending on the agricultural good (βAE
W) is greater than the 
maximum value of the agriculture production by either region (pA(max{Li,Lj})), mean that 
wages are equalised across the two regions (wi=wj=w).  
 
As pointed out before, operating profits are equal to sales divided the elasticity of substitution: 
πi=pT
ixi /σ. If units are appropriately chosen such that: a=(σ -1)/σ, F=1, K=1, Li+Lj=1, and the 
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If transfers from the national government are received only by the local governments (φ=0), 
region i’s share in total income becomes equal its participation in total population() iL i s δ = , and 
total income reduces to E
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12 By Walras’ Law, simultaneous equilibrium in all product markets implies equilibrium in the regional labour 
markets.   
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As we can see, conditions (b)-(c) and (f)-(h) are not affected, either directly or indirectly, by 
changes in how transfers are distributed between the two regions. In the case of the budget 
government conditions (d)-(e) changes in ei allow the government which receives larger (lower) 
transfers to hire more (less) people. Then, to labour markets to clear the region where public 
employment increases (decreases) the number of people employed in the agricultural sectors 
must fall (rise). Employment levels in the non-traded sectors and in manufactures remain 
unchanged. 
 
Replacing  iL i s δ =  and E
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As we can observe, when φ=0 operating profits do not depend, directly nor indirectly, on how 
the national government distribute the transfers between the two regions: 0
j i
ii ee




Moreover, the distribution of capital in the log run, that is the one for which πi = πj, depends only 
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we have that in order to achieve a long run equilibrium, the region with the larger population 
must have a larger share of the capital stock. Totally differentiating  ij π π −  with respect to sLi 
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As Figures 5 shows, if regions are symmetric, when sLi=1/2, the optimum distribution of capital 
is also symmetric: ki=1/2. 
 
Figure 5 
Region i’s share in manufacturing firms and the distribution of transfers  
(Li=Lj=0.5, τ =1.05; σ =10, βM=0.25, βA=0.55, βNT=0.2, φ =0, w=1) 
 
 
A different scenario emerges when φ> 0. From the expressions for πi and πj, changes in the way 








iL i se , and increase in ei increases δi. Then, if we were in 
a long run equilibrium situation, as ei changes the economy moves out of the equilibrium such 
that it is necessary a different distribution of the capital stock to re-establish the equilibrium. The 
direction of the change in ki required to achieve a new long run equilibrium depends on how πi 
and πj reacts to changes in δi and ki.   
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From the equilibrium conditions for the non-traded goods and the local government budgets
13 it 
































, such that an increase in 
the transfers received by region i increases employment in the public and the non-traded sectors. 
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Then, for a fixed distribution of capital ki, as ei increases  ij π π − also increases. To re-establish 
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Then, to achieve a new long run equilibrium ki needs to move in the same direction as ei moves. 
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Totally differentiating  ij π π −  with respect to δi and ki, and solving for  δ ii dk d  we have: 
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>  in order 
to labour markets to clear in each region. 
 
The reason for these different outcomes, depending on  0 or  0 φ φ = > , is explained because in 
the first case, independently of how the national government distributes transfers between the 
two regions, total expenditures in each region remain constant. This means that there is no 
incentive for firms to change location and move from the region transfers are taken away to the 
region which receives larger transfers. On the other hand, when  0 φ >  regions’ income shares 
are a positive function of the proportion of transfers received. Then, as ei increases region i’s 
market increases relative to the one of region j, such that operating profits increase in region i 
and decrease in region j. In response to this, firms find profitable to move from region j to region 
i. As firms move from region i to region j, operating profits falls in region i and increase in 
region j, this continues until operating profits equalise once again in both regions.  
 
As we can see in Figures 6 and 7, the effect on the location of capital is larger the larger is the 
share of transfers that go directly to consumers (φ) instead of going to local governments. The 
reason for this outcome is that as φ increases, the larger is ii e δ ∂ ∂ , such that for a given 
distribution of K, each unit of change in ei produces a larger change in  ij π π − , so the change in 
ki required to achieve a new long run equilibrium, namely  ij π π = , is also larger. 
                                                 
















Region i’s shares in manufacturing firms and the distribution of transfers 




Rate of capital relocation and distribution of transfers between  
consumers and local governments (φ) 




Case 2: a model with manufactures, non-traded goods and local governments 
 
The existence of a positive production in both regions by the agricultural sector guaranties that 
wi=wj=w. As we saw above this feature simplifies greatly the model. This is not necessarily the 
case when the agricultural sector is excluded. Only in some very special occasions, the 
completely symmetric case, wage rates in both regions will be identical.  
Using the same normalisations as above, namely F=1, K=1, Li+Lj=1, a=(σ −1)/σ, and choosing 
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Now changes in the way transfers are distributed between the two regions will have an effect on 
wage rates affecting also capital rewards. On the other hand, the distribution of capital affects the 
equilibrium wage rates. This feature of the model introduces a circularity which makes more 
difficult, when not impossible, to achieve closed form solutions. Because of this, the analysis in 
this section is based on numerical simulations. 
 
The behaviour of the model when the agricultural sector is excluded depends on the values taken 
by four parameters. Two of these parameters depend on consumers’ preferences, the distribution 
of expenditure between manufactures and the non-traded good (βΜ), and the elasticity of 
substitution (σ). The other two parameters are in a more of less degree policy choices; one is the 
share of transfers that go directly to consumers (φ), while the other is transaction costs (τ) that to 
some extent can be affected by the public sector.  
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As shown in Figure 8, the simulations show that in the four cases, the larger the value these 
parameters take, the more likely an increase in the share of transfers received by a region would 
result in an increase in its share of manufacturing firms. The intuition behind these results is very 
straightforward. The first result that emerges for the different parameter configurations in the 
simulation reported in Figure 8 is that as the share of transfers region i (ei) receives increases, the 
larger its participation in the country expenditure given by the parameter δi. Then, how this extra 
income is expended will have different effects on the location of manufacturing production. Let 
us now look at the intuition behind each of the four different cases: 
a.  A larger elasticity of substitution means that consumers care less about the number of 
manufactures varieties so they tend to consume more of domestically produced varieties in 
order to save on transportations costs. So, as the share of transfers (ei) region i receives 
increases, the extra income is mostly expended in locally produced varieties, increasing the 
rate of return of local firms and attracting those located elsewhere. 
b.  The intuition is relatively similar in the case of βΜ, the share of income expended in 
manufactures instead of the non-trade good. In this case, the larger βΜ is, the larger is the 
share of income coming from transfers that is expended in manufacturing goods than in the 
non-traded good. Once again, the increasing demand for manufactures in the region which is 
benefited from the increase in transfers raises the return to capital attracting firms from the 
other region.  
c.  With respect to the first of the policy choice parameters, transactions costs (τ), the larger 
these are the more consumers tend to consume domestically produced varieties in order to 
save on transaction costs. So, as a region income increases because of the increase in 
transfers it receives, the larger demand for varieties produced locally increases profits of 
local firms attracting those located in the other region. 
d.  Finally, we have the case of the φ parameter, the share of transfers going directly to 
consumers instead of local governments. In one extreme, when φ is equal to zero, transfers 
from the Federal government increases the consumption of manufactures only indirectly, 
trough the wages paid by the local government with the transfers it receives. However, as 
φ becomes positive, part of these transfers, those received directly by consumers, go directly 
to the consumption of manufactures, as well as also indirectly whilst φ < 1, such that the 
demand effect is larger in this second case, making more profitable to firms to relocate to the 




As the references provided above point out, it is theoretically and empirically possible to observe 
negative effects in terms of growth and development following an exogenous income shock. In 
the particular case of Argentina, the evidence suggests that regions which receive larger per 
capita transfers from the National government have shown a worse behaviour in terms of 
production of footloose activities, i.e. manufactures. The theoretical model presented in Section 
3 shows that this outcome depends on factors that are out of control of the public sector, i.e. 
consumer preferences, as well as other variables over which governments can influence on, such 
as how transfers are expended, and transaction costs. To be able to draw more conclusive 
evidence for the case of Argentina, particularly to disentangle among the different forces 
explaining the observed phenomenon requires a much more data demanding empirical exercise; 






Share of Region i in the number of manufacturing firms  
(βM=0.8; Li=Lj=0.5; K=1; τ=2; φ=0.5; w1=1) 
 
(σ=2.5; Li=Lj=0.5; K=1; τ=2; φ=0.95; w1=1) 
 
(βM=0.8; Li=Lj=0.5; K=1; φ=0; σ=2.5; w1=1) 
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